University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Dissertations and Theses in Agricultural Economics

Agricultural Economics Department

8-2017

An Economic Analysis of a Total Allowable CatchIndividual Transferable Quota System in a
Developing Country Heterogeneous Fishery: An
Application to the Digha Fishery in West Bengal,
India
Nadeeka Weerasekara
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, ndkweerasekara@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/agecondiss
Weerasekara, Nadeeka, "An Economic Analysis of a Total Allowable Catch-Individual Transferable Quota System in a Developing
Country Heterogeneous Fishery: An Application to the Digha Fishery in West Bengal, India" (2017). Dissertations and Theses in
Agricultural Economics. 38.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/agecondiss/38

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Agricultural Economics Department at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and Theses in Agricultural Economics by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF A TOTAL ALLOWABLE CATCHINDIVIDUAL TRANSFERABLE QUOTA SYSTEM
IN A DEVELOPING COUNTRY HETEROGENEOUS FISHERY:
AN APPLICATION TO THE DIGHA FISHERY IN WEST BENGAL, INDIA
by

Nadeeka Weerasekara

A THESIS

Presented to the Faculty of
The Graduate College at the University of Nebraska
In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements
For the Degree of Master of Science

Major: Agricultural Economics

Under the Supervision of
Professor Simanti Banerjee

Lincoln, Nebraska
August, 2017

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF A TOTAL ALLOWABLE CATCHINDIVIDUAL TRANSFERABLE QUOTA SYSTEM
IN A DEVELOPING COUNTRY HETEROGENEOUS FISHERY:
AN APPLICATION TO THE DIGHA FISHERY IN WEST BENGAL, INDIA
Nadeeka Weerasekara, M.S.
University of Nebraska, 2017
Advisor: Simanti Banerjee
This thesis contributes to the literature of economics of small-scale fishery
communities and fishery management in developing nations. In the first section we
review literature on state of the fishery resource and the livelihoods in the globe and
performance of fishery management systems in developing and developed countries.
Second section discusses the results of an empirical study on the economics of
subsistence fishers in Digha-Shankarpur in Eastern India. Results of the empirical
study shows by-catch by the trawlers leads to the depletion of target fish stock of the
subsistence fishers. Underutilization of the capacity by the subsistence fishers due to
the lack of fish stock leads to income losses and inequitable profit distributions among
fishers. Ultimately, lack of fish stock generates competition among subsistence
fishers. Given the identified economic conditions of fishers from the survey and the
literature on ecological studies, we focus on policy measures which can tackle the
dual problem of resource depletion and unsustainable competitive pressures on the
small-scale fishers. To this end in the third section we present a general scenario
analysis concerning the welfare of industry participants when there is a well-defined
rights based fishery management policy in place. To support the policy design we
extensively study the Digha industry setting and the status quo management of Digha
fishery. Given the heterogeneity of fishers and the segmented markets in Digha

fishery and the conflicts of interests among fisher groups, we consider two TAC
policy designs to regulate two segmented markets namely, trawler boat fishers and
subsistence fishers. According to the scenario analysis, two TACs for subsistence and
trawler boat fishers with an ITQ system is a better fit to achieve the sustainability
goals of the Digha fishery. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the TAC policy on
trawlers depends on the magnitude of by-catch reduction. Also, the policy
implementation is critical due to the poverty conditions in the developing countries.
However, this study makes a case for policy makers and researchers to carry out an
informed cost benefit analysis in implementing a TAC-ITQ policy in a developing
country fishery setting.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
Fish is a primary healthy protein source for people around the world. With the
population and continuous global demand for fish, fisheries worldwide have become a
source of income for millions of households. According to the 2014 annual
publication of Fishery and Aquaculture Statistics (published by FAO-Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations), “20 percent of average per capita
intake of animal proteins is supplemented by fish for more than 3.1 billion people in
the globe”. Available data shows a further growth in per capita fish consumption
(Figure 1.1) which has been supported by a continued growth of global fish
production to approximately 93.4 million tons in 2014. From this total capture 81.5
million tons was from marine waters and 11.9 million tons was from inland waters
(FAO publication, 2016). This continually increasing fish demand by a growing
global population implies that there is a huge challenge of feeding our planet while
preventing overfishing of fish stocks and safeguarding these stocks for future
generations.

Figure 1.1: World Fish Utilization and Supply
Source: The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture (FAO Publication, 2016)
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Sustainable fishing is thus a key issue globally, especially for countries and
communities where fish is an essential part of the diet and fishing an important source
of income. In order to serve the demand for fish and ensure sustainability of fish
stocks, there is also an increased production of fish from aquaculture. In 2014
aquaculture production accounted for 73.8 million tons (FAO publication, 2016). The
fishing sector also provides jobs to tens of millions of people in developing nations
(FAO, 2014). Fish is also one of the most-traded food commodities worldwide.
Especially in developing countries, fish contributes to a notable increase in foreign
currency earnings. The global fish exports in developing countries accounted for
about “54 percent by value and 60 percent by quantity (live weight equivalent) in
2014”. Compared to other agricultural commodities (rice, coffee, tea), net exports of
fish in developing countries have shown a significant increase. For instance, “USD 16
billion in 1994 to USD 20 billion in 2004 and USD 42 billion in 2014”(FAO
publication, 2014).
India is a large developing nation which depends on and contributes to the
fishery industry. Indian fish production has increased from “0.75 million tons in 195051 to 9.6 million tons during 2012–13” (4.5 percent average annual growth rate).
Increased fish production reflects the importance of this sector to the national GDP
and the domestic population (in terms of serving their nutritional needs). Also, foreign
exchange earnings from commercial fishing activities in India accounted for US$ 3.51
billion in 2012–13 (FAO, 2014). All these reasons illustrate the importance of the
sector on India’s economy and in providing livelihood. Thus, it is important to ensure
that sustainable fisheries management and environmental well-being is compatible
with fish demand and human well-being for long-term sustainable development. To
this end, promoting sustainable fisheries is an important challenge.
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In this research, we focus on the issue of marine fisheries management.
Fisheries management in general and marine fisheries management in particular is
challenged by the fact that fishery is a common pool resource and hence can lead to
the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968).Tragedy of the commons is a “market
failure that stems from overusing an open access resource because of poorly defined
property rights”. In fisheries, individuals act independently and according to their
self-interests, and harvest at rates far greater than the Maximum Sustainable Yield
(MSY-largest catch that can be constantly sustained without outside influences)
leading to resource depletion. Such market failure from tragedy of the commons is
common in developing countries where property rights for the fishing resources are
not well defined (FAO, accessed 2017).
Fishery management is also challenged by Illegal, Unreported, and
Unregulated (IUU) fishing. The FAO defines IUU fishing “as activities which include
fishing and fishing-related activities conducted in contravention of national, regional
and international laws, non-reporting, misreporting or under- reporting of information
on fishing operations and their catches, fishing by “Stateless” vessels, fishing in
convention areas of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) by nonparty vessels and fishing activities which are not regulated by states and cannot be
easily monitored and accounted for”. According to the FAO, IUU fishing occurs due
to weak fishery management regimes and poor monitoring and administration
processes (FAO, 2016). Poor management can threaten the sustainable fisheries
management and negatively impact the livelihoods of people dependent on it. In
developing countries which lack capacity and resources for effective monitoring,
control, and surveillance, the problem of IUU fishing can be very severe.
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Other than the management failures, introduction of mechanized fishing boats
and deep sea trawlers and the adverse fisher behaviors drive fish stock depletion. The
competition generated by these fisher groups threaten the local communities whose
livelihoods depend on the fisheries and the greater ecosystem. These issues have
made it necessary to enact legislation for regulation of fishery industry, especially in
developing nations while recognizing the situations specific to these nations such as
limited government resources, large and low income coastal fishing population etc.
In many developed countries (such as New Zealand, USA, Australia),
regulators have implemented well defined fishery rights systems such as TAC (Total
Allowable Catch) combined with ITQs (Individual Tradable Quotas). TAC is a limit
on total harvest by the fishers below the status quo levels of harvest. ITQs give TAC
shares or quotas to each fisher and allow fishers to trade their quotas with each other.
These policies help in reducing overfishing and ITQs reduce the race for catch by the
fishers which contributes to sustainable fishery management goals.
These policies however often involve high cost of implementation and
monitoring. In developing countries however, regional and local governments often
lack the financial resources and management personnel needed to assess the
biological and economical state of the fisheries and the communities that depends on
the fisheries for their livelihood. Thus, even when developing nations have fisheries
regulations in place, lack of resources prevents effective implementation. Within such
an impoverished setting, economic conditions of small-scale fishing communities can
further worsen amidst increasing conflicts between fisher groups competing to harvest
from the same fishery.
To this end, researchers have assessed the impact of prevailing comanagement systems (sharing of responsibility and authority between the state and
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resource-users) of fishery resources in developing countries using meta-analysis
approaches to identify the gaps in prevailing management systems (Evans et al., 2011;
Allison and Ellis, 2001; Knowler et al., 2009). According to the findings in the
literature, co-management has its pros and cons. They also found that the absence of
well-defined markets and property rights is also a key reason for overfishing and
mismanagement of fish stock. However, there are not many studies related to
economic analysis of introducing well-defined property rights in developing country
fishery contexts (Isaacs, 2011; Hersoug, 2011).
In this context, we study the Digha-Shankarpur marine fishery in the Eastern
Indian state of West Bengal to identify how the gaps in management of fishery
resources affect the fishery, the ecosystem and livelihoods of fishing community in
developing countries. This fishery is one of the important contributors to the West
Bengal fishing industry. However, recent biological and ecological studies indicate
that fishery resource in West Bengal is under the threat of depletion (Das et al., 2010).
Thus, there is a need to introduce legislation to manage fishery resources. For this
purpose, results of extant biological and ecological studies needs to be supplemented
by socio-economic studies of the fishing community who are dependent on the
resource and whose actions impact its sustainable availability. Moreover, the Digha
context also allows us to understand how the poverty levels interact with local fishery
industry organization in developing nations to influence the design and effective
implementation of a well-defined fishery management policy.

1.2 Objectives
The first objective of this study is to identify the threats to the eco-system and
subsistence fishing communities in developing nations from fish stock depletion,
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using an empirical study conducted in Digha-Shankarpur marine fishery. We present
socio economic information about the subsistence fishing community, as well as
information about the fishing fleet, production, earnings, savings, fishing efforts and
perceptions of these fishers regarding environmental threats.
Second, we present information on the status of prevailing management
system and the industry organization of Digha setting as a support for the policy
design and analysis. We conduct a general scenario analysis concerning the welfare
impacts for fishery industry participants (subsistence fishers, trawlers and briefly the
middlemen) of developing country heterogeneous fisheries resembling the Digha
fishery under a TAC and TAC-ITQ policy. I focus on three situations;
i) Discuss welfare effects in the absence of any policy i.e. status quo
ii) Introduce TAC and discuss how this is (or is it) better relative to (i)
iii) Introduce TAC with ITQ and discuss how this is better (or not) relative to (i)
and (ii).
Moving forward the policy objective of this study is to communicate the
research findings with the West Bengal Marine Fisheries Department to enable them
to make an informed decision about implementing a fishery policy given the available
resources and political background in the region, to ensure sustainable stock
management and economic development.
The economic analysis of the Digha fishers contributes to the literature on the
economic conditions of fishers in developing nations. Identification of the economic
conditions of fishers supports the management of fishery resource, fishing
communities and effective policy implication. In addition, this research will also
contribute to the broader literature on assessment and performance of well-defined
fishery rights systems in managing fishery in developing nations. Moreover, this
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research contributes to the literature on policy design, analysis and implication given
different contexts. For instance, this research focuses on heterogeneous and
segmented markets in Digha and poverty conditions of developing nations. In this
regard, this study is expected to be of interest to both policy makers and researchers
alike.
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Fishery Management in Theory and in Practice
2.1.1 A simple model of fisheries
Before identifying the economic implications of fishery management, it is
important to know the biological aspects of fisheries. Tietenberg and Lewis (2009)
explained the characters of the fishery using the basic bio economic model proposed
by Schaefer (1957). Schaefer model explains the relationship between effort and
harvest given the growth rate of the fish population (y-axis) and the size of the fish
population (x-axis) (Figure 2.1).
The graph indicates that growth rate increases as the population increases from
to

∗

and beyond this point population growth decreases as the population increases

till . At both

and

the growth of fish stock is zero. Here

is called as “natural

equilibrium”. Natural equilibrium is the population size that would persist in the
absence of outside influences and it is a stable equilibrium (natural equilibrium is also
known as carrying capacity).

is known as the “minimum viable population”. When

the population falls below , the growth rate becomes negative and the population
starts to deplete.

Figure 2.1: Relationship between the Fish Population (Stock) and Growth
Source: Tietenberg and Lewis (2009, p. 322)
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When the catch/harvest level is equal to the growth rate of the population, harvest is
said to occur at the rate of the sustainable yield since the stock can be maintained
forever. For an example the catch (sustainable yield) at stock

is ( ). Catch levels

exceeding the sustainable level results in short-term increases of net benefits but
jeopardizes future catch sizes since the fish stock gets reduced to a size not big
enough to reproduce back to its original population.

∗

is the stock corresponding to

the “Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY)” which is the highest growth. Thus, the
MSY is the “largest catch that can be perpetually sustained in the absence of outside
disturbances” (Tietenberg and Lewis, 2009).
However, the MSY is not the economically efficient yield. Efficiency is
maximizing the net benefit from the use of the resource (Tietenberg and Lewis, 2009)
and the yield value corresponding to this is termed the “Efficient Sustainable Yield”.

Figure 2.2: Efficient Sustainable Yield for Fishery
Source: Tietenberg and Lewis (2009, p. 324)
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In Figure 2.2, quantity of fishing effort is represented on the x-axis and the
benefits and costs of fishing effort are represented on the y-axis.

is the efficient

level of effort (where marginal benefit equals marginal cost). Thus, efficient level of
effort is less than the effort at MSY (

). However, with advance technology,

marginal cost of extraction decreases and the total cost curve rotates right. With this
new cost structure, both efficient level of effort and the efficient sustainable yield
increases beyond the sustainable yield at

. This increase in effort and catch

increases the net benefit for fishers. It is important to note that the expected results of
these models were given under the constant prices and constant marginal cost of
harvesting. However, there are other constraints which we should take into account.
First, “marginal harvesting costs are typically not constant, but rather increase as the
remaining stock size diminishes”. Second, “the basic model holds fish price constant,
but the size of the harvest can affect prices; larger harvests can depress prices”
(Tietenberg and Lewis, 2009).
In the open access fishery as property rights are not well-defined for the
fishers, no one can exclude others from getting access to the common pool fishery
resource. This situation leads to more fishers entering the fishery and they operate
where average revenue equals average cost (zero profits) by exerting more effort.
Figure 2.3 shows the open access effort level (
effort (

) compared to the efficient level of

). Open access fishery creates two kinds of costs: a simultaneous external

cost and an intergenerational external cost (Tietenberg and Lewis, 2009). The
simultaneous external cost results from overcapitalization of the fishery owing to the
presence of too many boats and fishers so that individual returns are lowered.
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Figure 2.3: Open Access Fishery Outcome
Source: Tietenberg and Lewis (2009, p. 328)

The intergenerational external cost occurs owing to long term stock reduction from
overfishing which, in turn, lowers profits from fishing due to the low harvest levels.
Low stocks over a sustained period of time combined with an effort of

leads to a

situation where fishers are not able to harvest the catch corresponding to this effort
level leading to economic inefficiencies. In this condition fishers exert too much
effort to catch too few fish. To overcome the problem of overfishing, to eliminate the
competition and to increase the efficiency gains among fishers, fishery management
policies are necessary. However, the implementations of these policies are based on
resource availability. This is especially true for developing nations.
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2.1.2 Institutions and regulations to manage fishery industry
2.1.2.1 Co-management:
Co-management of fisheries is an important approach to manage the resource
especially in developing country fisheries (FAO, accessed 2017). Evans et al. (2011)
describes co-management “as the sharing of responsibility and authority between the
state and resource-users but often involves collaboration between a variety of
stakeholders, including different government agencies, non-governmental
organizations, research organizations, private enterprises and civil society more
generally”. Co-management includes mechanisms such as “power sharing, institution
building, enhanced trust and social capital, problem solving and, more recently,
knowledge-sharing and social learning” (FAO, accessed 2017). Thus, the basic
principle behind co-management is “Community based management”. Studies
indicate that factors such as a community's shared norms and values which define the
relationships between members, use of shaming against defectors from the norms and
values and reciprocity facilitate coordination of behaviors across different groups of
people for effective natural resources management (Taylor, 1982; Haward et al.,
2000).

2.1.2.2 Property rights and fisheries management:
Assigning “property rights” to fishers is an important management policy to
regulate the over-use of open access fishery resources. The use of “property rights” or
“user rights” can refer to “different bundles of entitlements – privileges and
responsibilities assigned to fishers regarding the use of fishery resources” (FAO,
accessed 2017). While co-management is based on formal rules which rely on
legislation or regulatory instruments, assigning property rights leads to the creation of
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a market with the government involved in ensuring that the rights are not violated and
strictly enforced. Use of property rights in management of fishery is called “rights
based management system”. Assigning property rights involves four main criteria
(FAO, 2017).


Security- Allocation of secure property rights implies that fishers’ access and
use of their property cannot be challenged by other individuals.



Durability- This refers to the duration of the property right.



Transferability- This refers to the possibility of property rights/entitlements
being transferred (traded) to another property holder.



Exclusivity- This refers to the ways in which property right holders manage
and trade their property rights.
There are different ways in which property rights for fishing resources are

defined and distributed. Some policies consider the aggregate benefit to the ecosystem while others consider benefits to individual fishers as well. Based on these
benefits/incentives to those involved in fishery, the main types of rights based fishery
management schemes that are currently in use are TACs, IQs and ITQs (FAO, 2017).
Developed nations like New Zealand, Australia, USA, Canada, and Iceland have
extensively implemented fishery management plans through the use of TAC, IQ and
ITQ regimes.

Total Allowable Catch (TAC):
The total allowable catch “is a catch limit set for a particular fishery, generally
for a year or a fishing season and is usually expressed in tons of live-weight
equivalent, but is sometimes set in terms of numbers of fish” (FAO, 2017). TAC
limits the cap on fishing and is assigned by the specific government bodies related to
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fishery management in each country/continent. For an example in Europe TACs
are set annually for most stocks by the Council of Fisheries Ministers (European
Commission, accessed 2017). TACs are concerned with ensuring that total fish
landings don’t go beyond the catch limit. They do not focus on the harvest behavior of
individual fishers post implementation.

Individual Quota (IQ) and Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ):
IQs divide the total annual catch quota (TAC) into individual quota allocations
which are then distributed to the fishers. Thus, IQs are also termed “TAC shares”
(Arnason, 1993). IQs are an effective policy since fishers get security by holding on to
their property rights to fish without being challenged by other fishers and that
eliminates the incentives to race for fish. However, IQs do not provide incentives to
reduce the existing overcapacity of the fleet that is driven by low fish stocks (FAO,
2017). As a result, fishery policy has moved to the implementation of ITQs which
gives incentives to fishers to manage their resources efficiently. ITQs are tradable and
fishers can decide to sell/buy/lease quota depend on how much they want to
participate in the fishery. Tradability of ITQs helps fishers to manage their resources
efficiently while releasing the harvesting pressure on the fish stock. The allocation
criteria for ITQs may be based on the historical catch of vessels and with the goal of
benefitting current active fishing vessel owners (FAO, 2017).
Thus, there are many policies and regulatory processes to manage fisheries.
However, the applications of those policies are context specific. For example, the
extent of by-catch, discards of fish juveniles, use of advance technology by the fishers
all impact the design and success of these policies.
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2.2 Literature Review
Given the extent to which fishery context drives policy implementation and
performance, we summarize different fishery case studies to obtain a better idea about
different aspects of fishery management. This section gives extended information
about case studies related to the current biological threats to fishery resources and
economical threats to fishing communities. Further, we discuss prevailing
management systems and its loop holes considering developing nations. Moreover,
we discuss management systems of fishery resources in developed nations and their
effectiveness in different organizational settings.

2.2.1 Case studies on biological and economical issues related to fishery
Garcia and Newton (1995) summarized different aspects of fisheries such as,
fish production, state of the exploitation of fishery resources and the impact on fishing
communities due to resource depletion in the globe. The data showed 32 percent of
the stocks are under-exploited and 69 percent are exploited/beyond the level
correspond to MSY. The main reasons for the exploitation of the fishery resource are;
no selectivity in gear, by-catch (harvest untargeted species), discards (dead and
including unknown large quantities of juveniles), adverse fishing techniques
(trawling, dynamite fishing) etc. (Garcia and Newton, 1995; Alverson et al., 1994).
Alverson et al. (1994) emphasized the issue of fish discards which is one of
the critical factors in the fisheries nowadays. He estimated the discards by the world’s
marine fisheries amount to about 27 million tons with the global landings of 82.5
million tons. This indicates that about 25 percent of the fish caught is discarded.
Increasing degradation of the marine environment is another critical issue of concern.
Use of huge nets and trawling cause damage to the coastal region. Coastal region
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facilitates critical habitats, nurseries, feeding and spawning areas. The consequences
of the exploitation of coastal region mainly affects the small-scale fishers since they
harvest near the coast. For example, Garcia and Newton (1995) indicated such
decrease in production in coastal zone in the Black Sea region. The fishery resources
of this area, “which produced about a million tons of landings in the late 1980s, have
collapsed, through overfishing, to 100-200 tons in 1991”. The consequence of this
fishery collapse was reflected by the majority of the jobs that left the fishery industry
leading to hundreds of millions of dollars loss to the economy.
Das et al. (2010) studied sustainability of marine fishing based on a case study
of West Bengal. Other than the factors highlighted by Garcia and Newton (1995) and
Alverson et al. (1994), they paid more attention to the overfishing issue since fishery
is an open access resource and any one can harvest to their own interests. With the
increasing demand for fish, some governments encourage fishing industries in order
to support the production. West Bengal is also a major contributor to the fisheries
industry. Thus, the government facilitates this increasing demand for fish by investing
more on production. Some investments involve “introduction of mechanized fishing
vessels, improvement of fishing implements, establishment of infrastructure facilities
for preservation, processing, storage and transportation of fish, fishery products and
landing and berthing of vessels”. Facilitation of production leads to depletion of fish
stock for the future. Das et al. (2010) highlights the consequences of overfishing for
the West Bengal fishery that might face in the future by presenting some cases which
have been already facing issues due to over fishing, i.e. “In Northwest Atlantic,
herring catches have declined by 70 percent, Atlantic redfish declined by 50 percent
and Atlantic mackerel by 90 percent during the period 1970-1989”. Das et al. (2010)
showed increased mechanization of fishing vessels leading to exploitation of the
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coastal regions of West Bengal. Researchers suggest proper management can, by
controlling fishing effort, help marine fisheries to be sustained in the long run. Yet,
uplifting the living standards of fishing communities while safeguarding the fishery
resource is a challenging issue.

2.2.2 Evaluating fishery management practices in developing nations
Evans et al. (2011) conducted a meta-analysis regarding the impact of fisheries
co-management interventions across developing nations using 29 case studies. He
considered co-management mechanisms such as; “power sharing, institution building,
enhanced trust and social capital, problem solving and knowledge-sharing and social
learning”. This study used five main indicators to assess the outcome of comanagement practices in selected study sites. These were “access to resources,
resource well-being, fishery yield, household well-being, and household income”.
Results showed existing co-management practices leads to a decline in access
to the resource (not over using) and that leads to an increasing fishery yield over time.
The resource well being indicators and yield indicators suggested, in combination, comanagement interventions leads to improve resource status. The household well-being
and income indicators also showed a higher frequency of significant positive trends
(62 and 25 percent respectively). However, researchers argued this income increases
can be a result of non-fisheries resources, for instance, microcredit ventures or from
alternative jobs in urban areas. Study showed an increasing participation for the comanagement practices by the community. “None of the case-studies reported a
negative trend for participation, with only 5 percent of the total indicator frequency
indicating no change”. Rule compliance is the only process indicator for which some
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case-studies found significant negative trends (6 percent). Overall, the study
concluded the co-management is a better approach to manage small-scale fisheries.
Deepananda et al. (2016) studied how knowledge sharing works as a tool to
manage fishery resources in developing nations based on a case study of Southern Sri
Lanka. They found traditional fishers (stilt fishing is the traditional fishing method in
southern coast of Sri Lanka) hold detailed knowledge on biological and physical
indicators of fishery, such as; knowledge about weather, fishing season, feeding and
migratory behavior of target fishes. Most small-scale fisheries throughout the world
are based primarily on fisher knowledge, “which is essentially experiential knowledge
consisting of a replicable, verbally transmitted set of skills”. They showed traditional
fishers are more successful in fishing than non-traditional fishers since traditional stilt
fishers signal and provide inexpensive information to other fishers in their
community. They showed knowledge sharing can use as an expertise tool to produce
better management outcomes.
Allison and Ellis (2001) also explored conventional fishery management
approaches in developing nations. They indicated that community based management
approach does not show a significant improvement in resource well being and the
well being of livelihoods since the failures of community formation. Community can
be a “spatial unit, a social structure or a shared set of norms”. Spatial view of
community is, defining “Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries” (TURFS). TURFS are
problematic where the fish species are highly mobile (i.e. coastal small-pelagic fish).
According to the TURFS fishers are not allowed to go out of their fishing regions.
Thus, mobility of fish makes fishers to lose their profits. In the concept of “social
structure” in the community based management predicted being in the same social
state reduces conflicts in interactions and promotes coordination. However, rights
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depend on social status also critical in some cases. For instance, research in fishing
villages on Lake Malawi showed that, “ethnicity is often a critical issue in fishing
villages, with those involved in fishing frequently being migrants from other areas,
while long-term residents may be more interested in farming than fishing”. The
concept of “social norms” in community based management is also critical due to the
dynamic nature of norms. Based on the problems with community formation and
assigning rights, Allison and Ellis (2001) suggested encouraging reciprocal access to
resources (this allows mobility and can also be beneficial to stock conservation since
it enables fishers to move away from locally depleted resources), facilitate alternative
jobs, financial support mechanisms (i.e. loans) are important to manage fishery
communities and the fishery resources in developing nations.
According to the FAO (accessed 2017) limitations of community based
management arise due to difficulties in dealing with spill-over effects. One such
spillover effect is some fishers do not like to corporate with other fishers even though
the aggregate actions by fishers benefits the whole society. Fishers act independently
in order to maximize their own profits. The reason might be fishers have lack of
community ties with other fishers to believe that all the fishers will cooperate to
increase aggregate benefits. Fishers’ lack of commitment to justice and fairness is
another issue to not cooperate to manage fishery resource for the future. Also fishing
community might not be consisted with homogeneous fishers. For instance, in Digha
fishery there are large scale trawler boat fishers and small scale traditional fishers.
Thus, these two groups have different interests (target different species and different
markets) associated with their capability of engage in fishing (information gathered
through site visits to Digha). This heterogeneity contributes to fishers acting
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independently to maximize their profits since each fishing group has different
operational costs and skills.
Thomson and Gray (2009) studied how the transition of community
management to co-management changes the fisheries governance in the Cherai Poyil
fishery in the Cochin Estuary, Kerala, India. Study showed the co-management where
the power is shared among the government and the local community is a better way to
manage fishery industry. After the state government nationalized the Cherai Poyil
fishery as a national state property, fishers complained government puts strict
restrictions on use of the fishing gears. Also public auctioning of fishery rights
benefited private contractors leaving the local communities out of the business. Later
even the government handed over the management of the fishing rights to the local
community fisher’s organizations; management was not successful due to lack of
financial resources and personnel. Then the co-management was introduced.
Later the debate of commercial fishery (exports, large-scale processing)
management emerged from whether well-defined rights are necessary for the
sustainability of fishery resources (Kroetz et al., 2016). However, the most
assessments on well-defined rights based management of fishery resources were
based on developed countries (Kroetz et al., 2016). With the general demand for
rights based fisheries as the solution to fisheries problems in many developing
countries, researchers started to assess the feasibility of implementing rights based
fishery management systems in developing nations (Hersoug, 2011). Based on the
significant positive outcomes of well-defined fishery management systems in
developed countries, Hersoug (2011) brought up the claim, “rights based fisheries is
the solution, but should focus on the challenges of allocating fishing rights in
developing countries”. One challenge was limiting access (through rights-based
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approaches) might harm the poorest, the ones most dependent on the open access
resources. Also limited infrastructure-including for monitoring and enforcement of
compliance is a critical issue. The designing and development of quota markets is also
challenging in developing countries due to the lack of information on landings, i.e. in
developed countries reporting of landings are quite efficient. In Alaska there is a
fishing reporting regulation called “ADF&G (Alaska Department of Fish and Game)
fish ticket” under which all the fishers have to fill a form manually or electronically
regarding their landings and submit to the nearest ADF&G office before selling to
consumers. This system helps to accurately keep the records on landings (Alaska
Department of Fish and Game, accessed 2017). However, there is a little assessment
of economic analysis of performance of rights based fishery management systems in
developing countries (Kroetz et al., 2016).
To do an economic analysis of a rights based fishery management system in
the context of developing nations, it is important to understand the criteria to measure
the performance of a rights based fishery management system. From literature on
developed country case studies it is evident that the quota design details (allocation
criteria) and the context (status quo, market structure, industry participants) of the
fishery setting are important factors to analyze the economic impact of a policy. In the
next section we highlight several case studies on economic analysis of rights based
fishery management systems in developed countries.

2.2.3 Evaluating fishery management practices in developed nations
Researchers have studied economic impacts of rights based fishery
management policies for various fisheries. Arnason (1993) studied the impact of TAC
policy in Herring fishery in Iceland. He observed even though the TAC reduces the
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total fish catch, some fishers underutilize the fishing fleets due to competition postTAC implementation. The competition occurs due to the cap on harvest. Thus, the
efficient fishers (more experienced and high tech fishers) fill their boats before the
inefficient fishers, leaving inefficient fishers to underutilize their full vessel capacity.
That increase competition put greater pressure on fishers than under the open-access
fisheries since, under open-access fisheries, fishers are able to harvest without any
limit on catch. The race for catch is described as "Derby" or "Olympic"-fisheries
(FAO, accessed 2017). This race to harvest increases harvesting costs of fishers and
decreases the quality of catch (aesthetic appearance and freshness or degree of
spoilage-FAO, accessed 2017).
Later Arnason (1993) examined the social and economic impact of ITQs in
different fisheries in different times using empirical data of Icelandic fisheries. The
ITQ system was designed mainly for a certain gear, area and fish size. Study showed
various economic benefits of an ITQ. The elimination of competition for the fish
stock by ITQs (because fishers hold individual property rights) led to minimum
efforts by fishers and reduced harvesting costs. Revenues were increased by
improving the quality of catch. In a study carried out in Demersal fisheries it was
estimated the increase in revenues due to decrease in efforts and increase in quality
was 8.5 percent of the value of Dermasal fisheries in 1984. Also the economic rents
were calculated using the market for quota. Results showed in the first year of vessel
quota system 11 percent of outstanding quotas were exchanged. Over all the study
showed introduction of the ITQ system appears to have a dramatic increase in
efficiency of fishers.
Dewees (1998) studied the economic impact of ITQs in New Zealand
fisheries. New Zealand implemented ITQs for most of its commercial fishers. The
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allocations were based on catch histories and adjusted to meet the TAC levels for
different species. A low initial resource rental was charged. The interviewed sample
consisted of majority of small-scale quota holders and few vertically integrated
companies. These companies stated that “their firms’ relatively secure fish supplies
resulting from the ITQ system, enabled them to do long term planning and valueadded product development”. Small-scale quota owners had mix feelings towards
ITQs since the target species by them has undergone a significant decline by the TAC.
Study concluded pre-ITQ industry structure and the design details of each ITQ system
strongly influence the outcomes for industry participants.
Most of the ITQ research was focusing on the gains for the fishers due to
elimination of a Derby-style fishery and efficiency gains by trading quota. Little
attention has been paid to the potential gains from increase in fish prices (known as
ex-vessel prices) due to the less supply of fish. Herrmann (1996) showed that there is
a significant increase in ex-vessel prices with the introduction of ITQs. This is one of
the first studies which empirically examined the ex-vessel price effects and the
resulting revenue effects of an ITQ system.
Later studies focused on implications for the management policies by
incorporating the processing sector (purchasers of fish). Clark and Munro (2017)
studied an open access fishery model consisting of a competitive harvesting sector
and a monopsonistic processing sector. They showed given a competitive harvesting
sector, monopsonists manage the fishery in a socially optimal manner. Also Matulich
et al. (1995) showed when there is a monopoly harvesting sector and a monopsony
processing sector, bargaining between parties will help to joint profit maximization.
Studies were extended to analyze the economic impacts on processors when
the fishery management policy changes from open access to derby fisheries and to
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IQs (Steven et al., 2005). There is an argument on equity concerns for harvesting and
the processing sector with the implementation of a TAC or IQ system. TAC will put a
cap on total fish catch. Decrease in supply of fish result in increase of ex-vessel
prices. With the less supply of fish, processors invest on preserving techniques to
make fish available in the rest of the year. Processing preserved fish products involves
higher fixed costs relative to fresh fish. Higher ex-vessel prices and processing costs
increase the total cost to the processors and result some processors exiting the
industry. Steven et al. (2005) also showed how the transition of a policy from derby
style (TAC) to IQs impact processors. The reduction of race for catch by IQs spread
out landings over a longer period of time and allows better capacity utilization at
existing processing facilities. Thus, with IQs, reduction in ex-vessel prices will not let
processors exit the market since processors efficiently utilize the capacity. Thus,
implementation of IQs will not concentrate the processing sector.
Considering the studies in the literature it is evident that understanding the
current issues in the industry (biological threat, economics of fishing community),
status quo management, industry organization, and the design of the quota are
important factors to analyze the impact of a policy for industry participants. Other
than the context, a common limitation with TAC and ITQs is difficulty in monitoring
and enforcement. Monitoring and enforcement of a quota system is difficult as it
involves administration work and involves responsible personnel (FAO, 2017). This is
more challenging when it comes to monitoring whether individual fishers are
adhering to their quotas than when evaluating if an entire fishery is adhering to the
TAC.
Another limitation is inappropriate institutional arrangements. Not having a
proper network of management institutions/organizations can lead to breakdown of
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communication and cooperation between responsible parties (FAO, 2017). Countries
like Australia, Canada and New Zealand have showed moving towards a comanagement system reflects efficient management of fishery resources (FAO, 2017).
Such limitations are critical in developing country settings other than the context
specific limitations mentioned by Hersoug (2011). In the following chapter we are
going to study the Digha Fishery context extensively to support the economic analysis
of a well-defined rights based fishery management system in place.
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CHAPTER 3: DIGHA FISHERY
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Prevailing fishery management system in India
The fisheries in maritime states (within the territorial limits of 12 miles) and
inland waters of India are managed under the “Marine Fishing Regulation Act
(MFRA)”. These regulations were formulated by the Ministry Of Agriculture,
Government of India, in 1979 (The Fisheries Law Centre, accessed 2017). Some of
the fishery management regulations under the MFRA are, “prohibition on certain
fishing gear, regulation on mesh size, establishment of closed seasons and areas,
demarcation of zones for no trawling (use of huge nets by large scale commercial
fishers), turtle excluder devices and designation of no fishing areas”. Additionally,
“appointing responsible officials, issuing licenses upon meeting several standards,
registration of fishing vessels and penalties and fines in cases of non-compliance” are
some of the specific regulatory mechanisms under the MFRA (The Fisheries Law
Centre, accessed 2017). However, even though there is an established regulatory
framework, implementation of these laws are challenging due to the lack of
infrastructure and political pressures (Datta, 2014).

3.1.2 Prevailing fishery management system in West Bengal
According to the publication Bay of Bengal Program for Fisheries
Development (1990), fishery in West Bengal is managed by several institutions.
These institutions help in improving living standards of fishing communities as well
as enabling them to comply with fishery legislations. These institutions and their
functions are as below (Table 3.1).
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Table 3.1: Fishery Management Institutions in West Bengal and Their Functions
Institution
Functions
1. Marine Products Export
Development Authority

This organization facilitates the exports in
collaboration with the state government, by giving
subsidies, training and extension services to shrimp
farmers.

2. West Bengal State
Fisheries Development
Corporation

This organization was initially set up for the
development of fresh water fish farming. Currently,
it also facilitates charter of shrimp trawlers to
private companies.

3. West Bengal Fisheries
Corporation

This organization facilitates production of fish
seeds, trading fish, fish landing and also provides
fishers with infrastructure facilities such as fishing
nets, safety equipment etc.

4. Brackish Water Fish
Farmers Development
Agency

This agency is involved in arranging financial
support for the small scale fishers for their house
hold needs. In addition this agency offers training
and extension facilities to disseminate information
about modern technology among fishers.

5. Fishermen’s Cooperative
Societies (FCS)

FCS are three tier system comprised of fishers
(primary), district level officials (central) and state
level officials (apex). Fishers produce fish, central
bodies facilitate with inputs and state bodies
manage FCS under them. State bodies manage
fisheries though different marine fisheries projects
and also engage in conducting leadership
development training programs, setting up of ice
plants by the central societies and construction of
community halts.

6. National Cooperative
Development Corporation
(NCDC)

This organization assists FCS in several ways: share
capital assistance for marketing; supply transport
vehicles; development and establishment of fish
farms and seed farms/hatcheries; establishment of
processing units; procurement of motorized boats,
fishing nets; establishment of fish net-making units;
facilitate storage of fish; and establishment of retail
fish stalls with the necessary
equipment/installations.
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These institutions are primarily based on improving the socio economic conditions of
fishing communities which would increase fish production. Datta (2014) indicates
that many states such as West Bengal have no fishery legislation for the conservation
of the fishery resources partly due to the lack of availability of resources. Moreover,
over harvest has contributed to the depletion of fishing stock, which poses threats to
the future of Bengal’s marine fishery. Given this situation, the government has
focused on introducing policies to manage harvest rates and fish stock, and generate
livelihood opportunities as well as safeguard the marine ecosystem (Bay of Bengal
Program for Fisheries Development, 1990). For example, aquaculture plants have
been introduced to serve the fish demand and rural employment and income has been
channeled through the “Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee
Act” (MGNREGA).

3.2 Digha Fishery
3.2.1 Study site
The Digha-Shankarpur region is located in East Midnapore district in the
Eastern Indian state of West Bengal 115 miles south of Kolkata, the state capital. The
fishery, is one of the major fisheries of the state and supplies fish to both Indian and
foreign markets. According to the 2011 Census, out of the 46,532 individuals living in
the area, more than 20,000 individuals earned their livelihood from this fishery
(Mandal et al., 2013). Yet, despite the importance of this industry to the local
economy, the region is among the poorest in the country. Moreover, the fishery is
vulnerable to natural and anthropogenic stressors such as (i) cyclones (ii) water
pollution (iii) overfishing and (iv) competition from neighboring domestic (in Odisha)
and international fisheries (in Bangladesh). Fishing goes on for 10 months each year.
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Figure 3.1: Map of West Bengal, India with Location of Digha Circled

The fishery is closed every year from mid-April to end June in an effort to let the fish
stocks regenerate. All fishing activities undertaken by Bengal fishers take place within
200 nautical miles from the coast.

3.2.2 Market channel
There are three types of fishers in this industry depending upon their access to
technology which permits them to operate within specific distances from the
shoreline. Row-boat fishers are informally organized and operate within 5 to 7
nautical miles (nm) from the shore with manually operated boats. Motor-boat fishers
operate further out at a distance of 5 nm from the shore up to the limits of the
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territorial sea (12 nm). Beyond this distance and within 200 nm of India’s exclusive
economic zone, trawler boats operate.
Row boat fishers and motor boat fishers engage in subsistence fishing, and
partly sell their catch on the local market (through middlemen) and partly use the
catch for personal consumption. The species they catch typically fetch a lower price
per pound than those caught by fishing trawlers in the deep sea (which are mostly sold
in the larger Kolkata market-through middlemen). Generally the reason for harvesting
low valued species also implies the use of low tech “artisanal” fishing techniques
(traditional, non-mechanized). Having poor technology limits the ability of the smallscale fishers to go deep sea fishing. Subsistence fishing is carried out by people who
are among the poorest in the fishing community and are unwilling to take on the risk
associated with deep sea fishing. Subsistence fishers usually go on morning fishing
trips and they get paid for fish based on the demand for fish at a certain point in time.
Usually, middlemen offer a higher price to fishers who get back earlier in the
morning. Fishers who return later in the morning often have to settle for a lower price
since middlemen’s fish demand is highest in the early part of the day. It is better to
sell the fish at a lower price than discard the catch since subsistence fishers do not
have storage facilities. Besides the time of the day, fishing trips that yield a poor catch
also generates low revenue fishers. Sometimes, subsistence fishers go back on an
afternoon fishing trip particularly when the morning trip failed to generate sufficient
revenue for the day. On the basis of person interviews with fishers it is evident that
the daily earnings of fishers are sometimes less than their harvesting costs per day due
to low prices, more effort (due to more fishing trips and longer hours in the sea), and
less fish catch.
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Trawlers harvest commercially valuable deep sea species. Trawler boats
typically go for fishing for 8-10 days although in some cases the trips can extend up to
15 days depending on provisions available on the trawler for fishers’ sustenance and
catch storage. Information obtained on the basis of personal communications with the
local Digha fishers during the primary data collection indicated that, there are fewer
trawler fishers than subsistence fishers in the Digha-Shankarpur area. Trawlers who
engaged in long-voyage fishing carry ice in insulated cooler boxes installed on board.
So they have storage facility to keep fish fresh till they get back to shore and can take
the catch to the trading sites at specific times (Bay of Bengal Program for Fisheries
Development, 1990). Regardless of type, all fishers deliver the catch to landing
centers located near the beach by bicycles or carts. Digha and Jaldhaare the main
landing centers. There are middlemen who come to these two landing centers daily to
buy the daily harvest from the fishers, and middlemen sell fish in the local or Kolkata
market. Figure 3.2 shows the links between fishers and middlemen and the markets
where fishers and middlemen operate.

Figure 3.2: Market Channel of Digha
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3.2.3 Primary data collection
A structured questionnaire was developed utilizing the information gathered
from interviews with fishers and researchers in West Bengal, on the basis of site visits
in 2015. Discussions with personnel from the West Bengal State Fisheries Department
were useful to identify the development and environmental issues relevant to the
Digha-Shankarpur fishery. Data was collected between January 3 rd and 16th 2016. In
addition to surveys, personal interviews were conducted as well. A team of 10
surveyors visited fishing docks and fishers’ huts in 15 fishing hamlets. A total of 291
fishers were interviewed. Information related to the socio economic background of the
fishers, nature of their fishing fleet, catch and earnings, effort choices, level of
concern for environment etc. was collected.

3.2.4 Data analysis
Descriptive statistics of the sample:
Demographic characters:
Our sample focused on subsistence fishers. Table 3.2 provides a summary of
the demographic characters of the respondents. The average size of a Digha fisher
household is 5 and 97 percent of the fishers are married. 72 percent of the households
have only one earner in the family which further exacerbates the impoverished state
of these communities given the poverty in the region as a whole. Average age of a
fisher is 42 years and on average they have been engaged in fishing for 21 of these
years. More than half of the sample of fishers have completed primary level education
and continued to secondary level education. But, only 3 percent of fishers have
completed secondary school. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient of fishers’
age and years of education shows there is a negative correlation (-0.202).
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Table 3.2: Demographic Characters
Variable

Age of the fisher (years)

Years schooling

Marital status

No. of family members

Description

% of Respondents

10-29
30-49
50-69
≥70

12
61
26
1

0 (Illiterate)
1-4 (Below primary school
level)
5-11 (Completed primary
school but not secondary
school)
12 (Completed secondary
school)

7
25

Married
Single

97
3

<5
5-10
>10

58
41
1

1
No. of earners in the family 2
3
4
5

68

3

72
21
4
1
1

Thus, younger fishers in the data set are more educated which indicates a generational
increase in the emphasis placed on formal education in the community. Additionally,
younger fishers are more likely to engage in a second job to supplement income from
fishing and often times leave the fishing industry for alternative jobs (in Digha or
other parts of the state) given their educational levels.
Digha fishers were interviewed regarding the likelihood of their children
engaging in fishing in the future. Figure 3.3 shows 80 percent of the fishermen’s
children do not engage in fishing. Figure 3.4 indicates that of the families which had
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sons, the likelihood of sons fishing in the future is extremely unlikely. 61 percent of
the respondents revealed their sons are extremely unlikely to engage in fishing in the
future and are willing to leave the industry because of no economic prospect and
because of the obvious dangers of the occupation. Thus, the subsistence fishery may
dwindle as discouraged workers leave the industry for alternative jobs that pay more.
Such migration to other sectors has consequence for long term sustainability of the
subsistence fishery in the area.
Fishing fleet:
The sample of fishers consisted with 57 percent of manual row boat fishers
and 43 percent of motor boat fishers. These boats can be both jointly or individually
owned. Of the interviewed fishers 29 percent were boat owners, 51 percent were not
boat owners and 20 percent were joint owners. Generally, fishing crew consists of
family members, with the owner, often the head of the joint family who in many cases
is the fishermen with the most fishing experience. Though most crew members are
hired on a daily wage basis, joint-owners are entitled to a share which means they
divide total profits equally among the joint-owners (Marine Small-Scale Fisheries of
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Harvest:
According to a publication by the Bay of Bengal Program for Fisheries
Development (1990), major fish species harvested by trawlers, row boat and motor
boat fishers in West Bengal are shown in Appendix A. The data indicates that
between 1980 and 1984 total catch has increased rapidly from 6082 tons to 39640
tons. Trawlers in Digha catch mostly shrimp and other commercially high valued fish
species. Digha subsistence fisher group harvests commercially low valued fish species
such as Hilsa, Shad etc.
Income:
The mean weekly income of row boat fishers and motor boat fishers in Digha
are Rs. 1279 ($20) and Rs. 2220 ($34) respectively.1 Figure 3.5 shows the weekly
income distribution of the subsistence fishers and it depicts fishers in the area are
extremely poor as a whole. Also the respondents said that their daily income
fluctuates over time which implies the instability of income and the daily effort
choices of fishing families in Digha. According to the World Bank (accessed on
February 20, 2017) Gross National Income per capita of India in 2015 is 1600 US
dollars (Rs. 103,360) which implies the weekly earnings of an average Indian is
Rs.1988. This shows compared to an average person, row boat fisher have low weekly
income level and the fisher’s income level is not stable.

1

The exchange rate of Indian Rupees to US Dollars as at 07/10/2017 is, 1 Dollar=64.60
Indian Rupees.
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Figure 3.5 : Weekly Earnings of Fishers

Labor supply/effort choices:
One of the key goals of this study is to understand the determinants of fishers’
daily effort choice. Camerer et al. (1997) found negative labor supply elasticities for
taxi drivers in New York City, suggesting target-earning behavior whereby when the
daily earnings target is reached, taxi drivers will end their work shift, irrespective of
the number of hours worked. However, Farber (2005) found somewhat contradictory
evidence where their decision to terminate work on any day depends on cumulative
hours worked, and not on cumulative earnings. Gine et al. (2016) studied labor supply
of South Indian fishers and showed daily labor participation depends on expected
earnings but also on recent accumulated earnings. Given this contradictory evidence
and following Gine et al. (2016), we were interested in this issue since open sea
fishing like driving a taxi is an activity that poses risks to the individual (in terms of
life and health) and does not always generate a high revenue. Figure 3.6 indicates that
most of the fishers do not operate with harvest and earnings targets.
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Figure 3.6: Presence or Absence of Earning/Harvest Targets by Boat Type

For the motor boat group, we find some evidence of fishers setting earnings target for
themselves especially among boat owners. There could be multiple reasons for not
having earning/harvest targets. First, the high variability in earnings with the prospect
of not making any money on a regular basis might contribute to lack of target-oriented
earnings behavior. Moreover, fishers have high levels of risk aversion and are not
willing to take opportunities to earn more by switching to alternative jobs or joining
with trawlers. 67 percent of the fishers stated that they are extremely unlikely to join
large scale fishing where they can earn a guaranteed daily wage (Figure 3.7). For
example, a respondent who hadn’t had any earning over the past 22 days (owing to a
temporary jelly fish infestation that destroys nets) and whose family was surviving on
informal borrowing from friends and relatives said he wouldn’t work on a trawler
even temporarily if given an opportunity. Thus, overall unpredictability of the fishery
and natural ecosystem prevents the fishers from having fishing targets which they
could have if they are guaranteed some positive levels of income per trip.
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Finally outside of the fishery lack of alternative job opportunities is likely to reduce
their tendencies to consider harvest and earning targets (Figure 3.8).
Alternative Jobs:
All respondents attributed the low per capita earnings in the fishery to
depletion of fish stock owing to unregulated overfishing by trawlers, fish price
fluctuations at landing docks and weather hazards. In fact, 59 percent of all
respondents have a second job in Digha and nearby towns which underscores the
respondents’ propensity to avoid the physical exertion and risk associated with fishing
(both on trawlers and in the subsistence setting). This issue is important as it suggests
that low stocks and lack of regeneration can lead to the collapse of the subsistence
fishery in the future if most of the fishers find it is no longer profitable to stay in the
industry.
We also asked fishers who do not have a second job, the reasons for this
decision. 27 percent of the respondents ranked “there are lack of opportunities to earn
additional income” as the most important reason to not engage in a second job. This is
not surprising given the overall poverty of the area. 33 percent said “fishing makes
them too tired to engage in other activities for additional income” as the most
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important reason. Only 5 percent of the respondents said “fishing is their way of life –
they don’t want to do any other job” is the most important reason for not engaging in
second jobs. None of the respondents said “they are happy with their earnings from
fishing and don’t need another job” and “they don’t have additional skills needed to
do any other job” as important reasons for not having second jobs. The results imply
that improvement of subsistence fishers’ economic conditions will require a multipronged strategy that targets sustainable fishing behavior and creation of jobs within
the local economy.
Saving decisions:
Majority of the Digha fishers (80.73 percent) save less than Rs. 500 per week
(average savings is Rs. 298). Compared to the average weekly earnings (Rs. 1282) of
fishers, their weekly savings are nearly 23 percent of the average weekly earnings.
The Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation (accessed in 2017) projected
the average Indian household savings rate in 2016-2017 is 26.8 percent. Assuming the
average weekly savings rate of a fisher remains the same across weeks; fisher’s
savings rate is closer enough to the savings rate of an average Indian household. 94
percent of the respondents save for self and/or other family members; 75 percent said
they save for days without work (i.e. due to bad weather); 70 percent said for their
own future, 68 percent said they save for personal and family expenses during the
months they do not fish, 50 percent said for their sons’ education and 40 percent said
for their daughters’ education. 28 and 34 percent of the respondents stated they save
for children’s wedding and for home repairs respectively. None of the respondents
stated that they do not have interest in saving, which implies even though the fishers’
income is low they save to financially secure their future.
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Competition in fishing:
The survey indicates that subsistence fishers face competition from their peers
and from trawlers. Figure 3.9 shows fishers’ perceptions regarding the type of
competition they face from other fishers in different fishing villages on the survey
site. On the basis of the data set at least 30 percent of the surveyed fishers indicated
that they experience increased competition from the trawler boats and 33 percent of
the respondents said they face competition from other subsistence fishers. Fishers also
indicated that the competition with other subsistence fishers is influenced by the
harvesting behavior of trawlers. Respondents stated that they are aware that the large
deep sea trawlers are able to increase their landings both in terms of quantity and
variety of species harvested given the technology they have at their disposal. Some
species caught in the nets of the trawlers are untargeted by trawlers and generate no
economic value for them. In fisheries literature, these untargeted species that are
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Often these species are dumped in the ocean thereby resulting in a loss of fish stock.
However, these by-catch species are valuable to the subsistence fishers close to the
shore who typically would catch these species when they moved closer to the shore.
Depletion of target fish stock of the subsistence fishers makes them come to the shore
with empty vessels. The survey data showed 63 percent of the respondents take
fishing trips in all seven days of a week and average time spent on the sea per fishing
trip is 8 hours. This over commitment to resources leads to overcapitalization of the
fishery and generates contemporaneous external cost. More fishing efforts by
subsistence fishers implies, low stocks have resulted in more intensive fishing which
further contributes to depressing available stocks. Over usage of fishery resource
occurs as a result of unrestricted/open access entry to the fishery industry and due to
not having well-defined property rights. Thus, low stocks affect both livelihoods and
the safety of the fishing community since it pushes fishers to take more risks,
regardless of fishers’ preferences to do so. The situation is exacerbated because
fishers might find that fish caught in one trip is not sufficient to recover the total
expenses spent per trip. Hence, they have to go out to sea again.
Other than the by-catch problem, fishers claimed trawling causes damage to
the shore-line where the habitat for target species of the subsistence fishers is. Thus,
the fish mobility increases and fishers mentioned that, “in the past, they were able to
get expected harvest close to the shore but, in recent years; fish availability within 512 nm from the beach has significantly declined”. As a result, subsistence fishers now
have to travel further into the ocean. These fishing pattern changes are problematic
especially for row boat fishers who have to expend considerable physical energy in
rowing the boats. Also risk for fishers increase overall in terms of the additional
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danger faced because their boats are not equipped to handle the dangers of the open
sea.
Environmental threat:
Another main source of risk faced by the fishers in Digha-Shankarpur fishing
industry stems from uncertainty of weather patterns, climate change and water
pollution. 68 percent of the respondents revealed they lose 10-15 fishing days per
month due to bad weather. According to Figure 3.10, to supplement the loss income,
fishers increase the days and the time spent on fishing in the days with better weather
conditions to get a good catch. Some fishers borrow money from others to meet the
expenses. Also we asked fishers about the precautions they take for bad weather.
Almost all fishers said they do not take any precautions since they do not have money
to spend on safety precautions. Thus, they have to engage in risky fishing activities
and take risks even though it might not be in their best interests to do so.
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Figure 3.10: Strategies to Supplement Income Losses from Lost Fishing Days
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Of the few respondents who take some precautions, these involved getting a sturdier
boat, taking a wireless GPS tracker when fishing and carrying a life jacket, tube
and/or water pump with them (to bail out water). Despite the inherent risk of the
occupation, 55 percent of the fishers do not have life insurance. Of those who do have
insurance the average insurance premium paid by the fishers was Rs. 1544.
Fishers’ concern for climate change and water pollution is very low. 62
percent of the respondents said they are not at all aware of climate change/water
pollution. 23 percent of the respondents are slightly concerned, 11 percent are
moderately concerned and only 4 percent are extremely concerned. One reason for the
lack of awareness of the climate change/water pollution might be the insufficient
knowledge of the fishers. Moreover, despite the climate change and fluctuating
weather patterns being important determinants of fishery health, immediate economic
concerns may be preventing fishers from dwelling on these long-term threats and
more on the relatively short-term threats posed by trawlers. However, lack of
awareness leads to face risk situations in the ocean and ultimately leads to more
fishing efforts and low income levels. Knowledge sharing, where experienced fishers
make other fishers aware of the climate and weather conditions, could result in
awareness about these issues and how fisheries can be managed and made more
resilient in the future.

3.2.5 Conclusion
Considering the previous ecological and biological studies and the economic
study of the Digha subsistence fishery on the basis of the data collected, it is essential
to increase effective government regulation and monitoring to secure fishery resource
and the livelihoods of fishing families in Digha. The economic study highlights,
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Digha subsistence fishers facing income losses and that leads to not having prospects
for future generation to engage in the fishing industry. Thus, there is a possibility of
collapse of the market of local fishing community.
The leading cause for the low income levels is the depletion of target fish
stock of the subsistence fishers. As identified trawler’s by-catch is the main cause for
the depletion of fish stock. The competition generated among subsistence fishers due
to depletion of fish stock and increase in efforts further intensifies the rates of
depletion and low income among subsistence fishers. Thus, the regulation should
address the dual problem of depletion of fish stock and as well as the competitive
pressures of the subsistence fishers which affects the economic conditions of the
fishing families, health of the fishery resource and the fishery industry as a whole.
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CHAPTER 4: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF A RIGHTS BASED FISHERY
MANAGEMENT POLICY IN A HETEROGENEOUS FISHERY SETTING
4.1 Introduction
This chapter identifies the policy measures under which the dual problem of
stock depletion and unsustainable competitive pressures on the subsistence fishers in
Digha can be tackled. The issues of depletion of fish stock and the competitive
pressures among fishers arise due to not having an effective monitoring process of
existing regulations. Moreover, current amount of regulation is inadequate as well.
According to the information gathered from officials in West Bengal Fisheries
Department, fishing in the Digha goes on for 10 months per year. The officials stated
the existing seasonal closure policy may not be sufficient to regenerate the fish stock
given the increased fishing effort during the fishing season. Hence, additional policy
intervention is required to sustainably manage the resource. Other than the
management failures of existing systems, not having well-defined property rights
determining fishers’ access to the resource is a major reason for the depletion of the
fish stock and the competition. To this end we focus on the relevance of a welldefined rights based policy in Digha to sustainably manage the fishery resource and
the livelihoods of subsistence fishers. In order to do so, we focus on both subsistence
fishers, trawler boat fishers and the middlemen since the behavior and policy targeting
one industry participants impacts the others.

4.2 Economic Analysis of a Rights Based Fishery Management Policy
Figure 4.1 presents the key factors to be considered for the economic analysis
of any rights based fishery management system.
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(1)
Identification of the
issues in the fishery
(condition of the
ecosystem and the
fishers)

(2)
Status quo:
•Status of prevailing
management system

(3)
Design of the
policy and
analysis

•Industry organization

Figure 4.1: Criteria for Economic Analysis of a Rights Based Fishery Management
Policy

The identified criteria for the economic analysis of a rights based fishery management
system are from an extensive analysis of the case studies which we have described in
the literature review section. Design of a rights based fishery management policy is
context specific. A key feature of the Digha fishery is that it is a heterogeneous
fishery with the co-existence of both subsistence fishers and trawlers. The subsistence
fishers are affected by the fishing behavior of the trawler fishers although the markets
for subsistence fishers and the trawlers are segmented since they target different
species of fish (type of fish caught is a function of the fishing technology these two
groups have at their disposal). Given this heterogeneous fishery setting and the
conflicts of interests of fisher groups, we focus on a policy design which can
individually regulate the two segmented markets to achieve sustainable fishery
management goals. To this end we consider separate TACs for each fisher group.
In the next section we come up with a basic theoretical model for fishers’
profit maximization problems and we discuss the welfare impacts for subsistence
fishers and trawlers under three situations.
1. In the absence of any policy i.e. the status quo.
2. With a TAC and discuss how this is (or is it) better relation to the status
quo.
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3. Introduce TAC with ITQ and discuss how this is better (or not) relative to
the status quo and only the TAC.
Further, we briefly explain the impact on middlemen and the final consumers due to
the TAC and TAC-ITC policy.

4.3 Theoretical Model
Fishery industry participants:
We consider two groups of fishers namely trawlers and subsistence fishers. In
the Digha fishery setting subsistence fisher group consists with motor boat fishers and
row boat fishers. But for the modeling purposes we do not consider the heterogeneity
within the subsistence fishers group. Fishers sell fish to the middlemen. Table 4.1
summarizes the industry participants and their characteristics. Each fisher engages in
fishing in a vessel that is large (Trawlers) or small (Subsistence fishers) (types t or s,
respectively). Trawlers target “T” species and subsistence fishers target “S” species.
All vessels of a given type are assumed to be identical in terms of the fishing
technique and the target fish species. Within each group of fishers there are efficient
fishers who have more fishing experience and hence are aware of the dynamics of
fishing, and so are able to increase their harvests with less effort.
We use similar specifications of average costs and fixed costs of fishers as in
Keisaku and Shunsuke (2010) which index large scale fishers with low variable costs
and small scale fishers with high variable costs. The jth fisher’s total cost (

) is the

sum of fixed cost and the variable cost.
=

+

(

)

i implies the two groups of fishers t and s. Fixed costs (

(1)
) of the fishers in a one

group are similar. Fixed costs of trawlers is greater than the fixed costs of subsistence
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fishers. Total variable cost (

) differs among all fishers since the effort levels are

different from one fisher to the other. However, we assume for each effort level,
average variable cost (

) is constant for both groups of fishers and average

variable cost is less for the trawler boat fisher group than the subsistence fisher group.
(

<

). Thus, the simple function for total cost can be written as

=

.

is the average variable cost and is different from subsistence fishers to trawlers and
the efforts (

) are different for each fisher in the same group. Trawler fishers are

efficient than the subsistence fishers.
As mentioned previously, use of large nets by trawlers leads to by-catch which
affects the fish available for subsistence fishers. Following Mukherjee (2015), we
assume that by-catch is a constant fraction of total harvest by the trawlers. The catch
coefficient (b) captures this relationship.

Table 4.1: Industry Participants
Industry participants

Characteristics

Subsistence fishers (s):

*Harvest species which have low value in
the commercial markets outside the area.
Thus, sold in Local markets.
* Average Variable Cost of harvesting is
high (AVCs)
*Total Fixed Cost is low (TFCs)

Trawlers (t):

* Harvest species which have high value in
the commercial markets. Thus, sold in
Kolkata market.
* Average Variable Cost of harvesting is
low (AVCt) (more efficient fishers)
* Total Fixed Cost is high (TFCt)
*By-catch coefficient is b

Middlemen:

*Homogeneous
*Middlemen buy fish from subsistence
fishers and/or trawlers and sell in the
Digha Local market (L) and/or commercial
market in Kolkata (K).
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Middlemen are price setters and fishers are price takers so that at any price,
fishers operate as competitive firms and can sell as much fish as possible at the
market price at that time of the day. Note, if we assume, both types of fishers sell to
middlemen who set the market prices, then these fishers merely respond to the set
prices by adjusting the output decision. The prices set by the middlemen can depend
on other factors such as price offered both in the Kolkata and the local Digha market,
rise in export demand, total available supply, transportation cost, and storage cost.
Middlemen sell low value fish in the local market and commercially valued
fish both in the Kolkata and local markets. But we assume the portion sold in local
market does not significantly affect the profits of the middlemen since the demand for
commercially valued fish is low in the local market. Individual Digha middlemen are
price takers in the local/Kolkata market as there are many outside fish suppliers.
However, changes in the total supply by the Digha middlemen can affect the price
they receive in the local/Kolkata market. Considering the industry participants and the
organization structure, the following section explains the welfare impacts for
subsistence fishers, trawlers and the middlemen under pre-quota and post-quota
conditions.

Pre-quota condition:
Assumptions:


Each fisher is a price taker. Price per pound received by subsistence fishers
is



and price per pound received by trawlers is

.

Marginal cost of effort for trawlers and subsistence fishers is constant and
presented by .



Quantity harvested is a function of effort ( ) and available stock ( ).
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Following Mukherjee (2015) and Munro (1982), we assume harvest function for the
jth trawler fisher of type k is

. Similarly the harvest function for the jth

=

subsistence fisher of type k is specified as,

=

. Here, ∝ and

are the

catch coefficients for trawler fishers and subsistence fishers respectively (∝ >

).

Subsistence fishers and trawlers have different catch coefficients since they have
different technology. Catch coefficient varies among less efficient (k=L) and more
efficient (k=H) fishers within the same group (L<H).
fisher.

is the effort of jth trawler fisher.

a jth subsistence fisher and

is the effort of jth subsistence

is the available stock of “S” species for

is the available stock of “T” species for a jth trawler

fisher. Each fisher targets only one type of species.
Availability of the stock of each species type depends on the harvest by the jth
fisher and the harvest by other fishers in the group who target that type (we do not
know if the available stock is enough to catch the optimum levels of harvest. Thus, we
take into account the harvest by other fishers in the group which leads to competition
to harvest under the lack of target fish stock). As mentioned, for subsistence fishers
availability of the stock of their target species is also affected by the by-catch by the
trawlers. The modified stock level function for a subsistence fisher is thus given by,
=

−

−

(2)

In this expression, the available fish stock of “S” species is inversely related to the
total effort by the subsistence fishers ( ) and the by-catch coefficient (b)*total effort
by the trawlers ( ).

is the total by-catch by the trawlers.

is the total harvest

by subsistence fishers. The modified stock function for a trawler fisher is given by,
=

−

(3)

This shows that the available fish stock of “T” species is inversely related to the total
effort by the trawler fishers ( ).

is the total harvest by trawlers. Subsistence
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fishers’ effort does not affect the target fish stock of the trawlers.

and

are the rate

at which the stock is depleting (or the harvest rate) with a unit increase in effort by a
trawler and a subsistence fisher respectively.
In the absence of any regulation; the profit maximization problem for a jth
trawler fisher (for both types-efficient and inefficient) is:
Max

=

.∝

−

I replace the stock
Here

−
=

by

(4)
−

is the initial stock less the harvest by all other trawler fishers except the jth
is the harvest by jth trawler fisher. Fishers maximize their

trawler fisher and

profits by choosing the optimum effort levels represented by,
=

Max
=

∝

∆

I plug the

∗

(
−

=

∆

∗

.∝

∝

−
∝

−2

∝

=

)−

−

−

−
−

=0

(4a)

to the harvest function and it gives,
∗

=

∗

−

∗

(4b)

The profit maximization problem for a jth subsistence fisher (for both types-efficient
and inefficient) is;
Max

=

.

I replace the stock

−
by

−
=

(5)
−
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Here

is the initial stock less the harvest by all other subsistence fishers except the

jth subsistence fisher and

is the harvest by jth subsistence fisher. Fishers

maximize their profits by choosing the optimum effort levels represented by,
=

Max

.

(

=

I plug the

∗

)−

−

∆
∆
∗

−

=

−

−
−2

−
−

=0

=

(5a)

to the harvest function and it gives,
∗

∗

=

−

∗

(5b)

However, because of the by-catch by trawlers, subsistence fishers will not be
able to harvest the optimum level of fish they have caught before. The new effort and
the quantity harvest by a subsistence fisher are:
=

(new stock function is,
(
Max

−

−

; we deduct the amount of by-catch

= ) from the previous available stock)
=

.

(

−

=
∆
∆

− )−
−

=

−
−

−2

I plug the

−
−

=

(6)

−

−
=0

(6a)

to the harvest function and it gives,
=

−

−

(6b)
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From 6b, it is evident that subsistence fishers catch less fish (

∗

>

) due to the

by-catch by trawlers. This leads to a profit loss to the subsistence fishers. Since the
target fish stock of the subsistence fishers is under the threat of depletion, a policy
should be in place to put a cap on the harvest and to allow the stock to regenerate. The
policy should reduce the by-catch and at the same time reduce the aggregate harvest
by the subsistence fishers to a certain level. Thus, in the next section we consider
imposing two TACs on trawlers and subsistence fishers to regulate the two segmented
markets.

Post TAC condition:
As subsistence fishers and trawlers catch different species of fish, TAC for
subsistence fishers is different from TAC for trawlers. We name those two TACs as
TAC-T (TAC on trawlers) and TAC-S (TAC on subsistence fishers). These TACs
depend on the damage to the stock of the target species by the respective fishers.

i) Effect of TAC on subsistence fishers
If the TAC-T leads to a reduction in the by-catch, then there will be more fish
available for subsistence fishers. Given the availability of more fish to subsistence
fishers, the competition among subsistence fishers can potentially decrease if the
reduction in by-catch makes subsistence fishers harvest more than what they
harvested in the pre-quota condition (

). Given the availability of more fish,

subsistence fishers might over fish in the long-run due to the overcapitalization of the
resource. TAC-S will resolve the problem of over fishing by the subsistence fishers in
the long-run. With the reduction in by-catch, TAC-S can be relaxed in the long-run
once the target fish stock of subsistence fishers regenerate to the corresponding

54
sustainable yield level. On the other hand reduction in the supply will increase the
prices of subsistence fishers. Thus, profits of the subsistence fishers might increase
than the status quo profits. In this scenario TAC policy will achieve the goal of
reducing over-fishing problem and also can reduce the competitive pressures among
subsistence fishers.

ii) Effect of TAC on trawler fishers
The implementation of TAC-T policy will limit the total fish catch by the
trawlers. Thus, efficient fishers in the group are able to harvest in a way to reach the
TAC-T leaving very little fish for the inefficient fishers. TAC on trawlers will
increase the competition among trawler fishers. Decrease in the total supply of fish by
the trawlers will lead to increase in prices trawlers received by the middlemen. Profits
of the trawlers depend on the net effect of efforts, quantity harvest and the increase in
prices. However, even though the TAC reduces the overfishing problem and the bycatch by trawlers, TAC-T will increase competition among the trawlers leaving
inefficient fishers worse off.

iii) Effect of TAC on middlemen and the consumers
Reduction in the aggregate supply by the trawlers and the subsistence fishers
due to the TACs will increase the prices middlemen offer to the subsistence fishers
and the trawlers, and that will negatively impact the profits of the middlemen.
Decrease in aggregate supply will increase the prices middlemen receive in the local
and Kolkata markets and that positively impact the profits of the middleman (Figure
4.2). The profits of the middlemen depend on the net effect of price offered to the
fishermen and price received by the middlemen in the local/Kolkata market. Increase
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in prices in the local/Kolkata market will negatively impact the consumers. Figure 4.2
illustrate the price increase from

∗

to

with the cap on total harvest which is the

TAC.
Even though the TAC policy can achieve the goal of reducing fish stock
depletion, it can potentially increase the race for fish among efficient and inefficient
fishers. Thus, we focus on a policy which can assign entitlements to each fisher in the
group to secure their harvesting rights and to benefit the inefficient and efficient
fishers simultaneously. Thus, in the next section we focus on proposing a TAC-ITQ
policy for the two groups of fishers in the Digha setting and analyzing the welfare
effects for industry participants.

Post-TAC-ITQ condition:
Implementation of ITQs with a TAC will reduce the total catch owing to the
presence of the TAC and reduce the race for fish as all the fishers in a group get rights
to harvest a specific amount of fish for a given period of time. However, assigning
entitlements for each fisher have a drawback to the efficient fishers.

Figure 4.2: Price Fluctuation with the TAC Policy
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The reason is even the efficient fishers have the ability to harvest more; the ITQs does
not allow them to catch more due to the quota and leads to underutilize the capacity.
The transferability of the quota addresses the drawback of underutilization of the
capacity by efficient fishers. Allowing trade of quota between efficient and inefficient
fishers will allow fishers to decide how much each fisher will participate in fishing.
The decisions depend on the net benefit for each fisher by trading quota and the
harvesting. In the Digha fishery, since trawlers and subsistence fishers target different
species of fish, ITQs can be only traded within the group (i.e. subsistence fishers can
only trade quota among subsistence fishers and trawlers can trade only among
trawlers).
Assumptions:


Each subsistence fisher gets a same proportion of TAC-S as the initial quota
allocation-individual quota (

). Similarly each trawler gets a same portion of

TAC-T as the initial quota allocation (


Maximum seasonal length is

).

.

The profit function for a jth fisher following Matulich and Sever (1999) is (to
show the effects of the ITQ policy, I specify the profit function explicitly in terms of
quantity),
Max

=

−

−

−

́

(7)

“i” implies the subsistence fisher group or trawler fisher group.

is the price

subsistence fisher/trawler fisher receives after the TAC-ITQ implementation.
quantity harvested by the each fisherman.

is the

is the average variable cost of effort by a

subsistence fisher/trawler (average variable cost of effort of a trawler fisher is less
than the average variable cost of a subsistence fisher).

is the price of quota in the
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subsistence fisher group/trawler fisher group.

́ is the amount of quota that is bought

or sold out by a jth fisher in fisher group i. If the quota is purchased
quota is sold out

́ > 0 and if the

́ < 0 . This implies purchasing of quota negatively affects the

profits and selling of quota positively affects the profits. The constraint for quantity
=

harvest is,

+ ́ . This implies, the quantity harvest should be less than or

equal to the sum of initial quota allocation and the purchased/sold quota.
Fishers maximize the profit with respect to quantity and it gives,
Max

=
́ with (

I replace
Max

−

=

−

−

−

−

−

́

)

−

∆
∆
−

=
=

−
−

−

(8)
=0
(8a)

Note: the quota is tradable only within the group since two groups target different
species. Thus

is the marginal cost where “i” represents the subsistence and trawler

fisher group and “k” represents the efficient and inefficient fishers within a group.
Here,

−

=

implies fishers participate in the harvesting if the marginal

benefit from fishing is greater than or equal to the market price of quota. Thus,
allowing trading of quota is an efficient way of managing the fishing efforts by the
fishers (inefficient fishers can sell the quota and reduce their fishing efforts while
efficient fishers can get the maximum advantage by harvesting to their full capacity
by buying the quota).
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4.4 Results and Conclusion
Given the constraints and context of Digha setting, TAC with an ITQ could be
a better fit since the subsistence fishers are already in a greater competition to harvest
intensively. ITQs with TAC will tackle both issues of depletion of fish stock and the
competition among fishers. Thus, the TAC-ITQ policy will achieve the government
objective of improving the efficiency of fishery industry in Digha area. In other words
TAC-ITQ provides a solution to manage fisheries in developing nations by reducing
the environmental damages associated with over fishing, which would improve social
welfare.
If the TAC on trawlers reduces the by-catch, assigning two TACs for both
groups is the best way to manage two segments of the market. Also the reduction in
the by-catch would allow relaxing the TAC on subsistence fishers once the target
stock of the subsistence fishers reach the level corresponds to sustainable yield level.
If the TAC-T is not large enough to reduce the by-catch, there should be a different
policy implication to reduce the by-catch by trawlers.
The TAC with ITQs policy will also impact the prices middlemen offer to the
fishers and the prices middlemen receive in the local/Kolkata market as well. Thus, it
is important to evaluate the impact of the policy in terms of all industry participants
while resolving the problem of stock depletion and competitive pressures of fishers.
Also it is important to compare the rents for industry participants before and after the
policy implementation. Even though the policy achieves its goals, the individuals who
have been better off without the policy might be worse off after implementing the
policy. Also compared to the status quo, the rents of the individuals might be reduced
after the implementation of the policy, even though the policy achieves its goals (i.e.
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if the TAC for subsistence fishers is very low since the stock for low value fish is
more depleted due to the by-catch, TAC might worsen the poor fishers).

4.5 Challenges of Implementing the Policies and Suggestions
As discussed in previous chapters, results of the welfare analysis for industry
participants is not sufficient to decide if the policy is feasible to implement in the
specific setting. There are issues related to each setting. One issue is not having
accurate data on historical catches and prices which is important to design TAC and
ITQs. Second major issue is lack of resources, political instability and inappropriate
institutional arrangements in developing countries to implement the policy and
monitoring to see if the policy works in the setting. However, this model makes a case
for implementing the TAC-ITQ policy among fishermen to see how this enables
policy makers and researchers to carry out an informed cost benefit analysis in the
developing country fisheries sector.

60
REFERENCES

Allison, E., and Ellis, F. (2001). The Livelihoods Approach and Management of
Small-scale Fisheries. Marine Policy, 25, 377-388.

Alverson, D. L. (1994). A Global Assessment of Fisheries By-catch and Discards.
Food and Agriculture Organization.

Arnason, R. (1993). The Icelandic Individual Transferable Quota System: A
Descriptive Account. Marine Resource Economics, 8, 201-218.

Camerer, C., Babcock, L., Loewenstein, G., and Thaler, R. (1997). Labor Supply of
New York City Cab Drivers: One Day at a Time. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 407-441.

Clark, C., and Munro, G. (1980). Fisheries and the Processing Sector: Some
Implications for Management Policy. The Bell Journal of Economics, 11, 603616.

Commercial Fishing Reporting., 2017, fromhttp://www.adfg.alaska.gov/index.cfm?
ad fg=fishlicense.fishtickets

Das, T., Neogy, R., and Chakraborty, D. (2000). Sustainability of Marine Fishing: A
Case Study of West Bengal. Applied Economics Letters, 7, 707-710.

Datta, S. (2014). Inland Fisheries Legislation in India. Fishcoops, 26, 9-15.

Deepananda, A., Amarasinghe, U., Jayasinghe-Mudalige, U., and Berkes, F. (2016).
Stilt Fisher Knowledge in Southern Sri Lanka as an Expert System: A Strategy
Towards Co-management. Fisheries Research, 174, 288-297.

61
Dewees, C. (1998). Effects of Individual Quota Systems on New Zealand and British
Columbia Fisheries. Ecological Applications, 8, 133-138.

Evans, L., Cherrett, N., andPemsl, D. (2011). Assessing the Impact of Fisheries CoManagement Interventions in Developing Countries: A Meta-analysis. Journal
of Environmental Management, 92, 1938-1949.

Farber, S. (2005). Is Tomorrow Another Day? The Labor Supply of New York City
Cab drivers . Journal of Political Economy, 113, 46-82.

Fisheries Management and Safety., 2017, from http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x9656
e/X9656E03.htm

Fishery and Aquaculture Statistics (2014). Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations.

Garcia, S., and Newton, C. (1995). Current Situation, Trends and Prospects in World
Capture Fisheries.

Gine, X., Bravo, M., and Fernandez, M. (2016). Are Labor Supply Decisions
Consistent with Neoclassical Preferences? Evidence from Indian Boat
Owners. Unpublished manuscript.

GNI Per Capita: India., 2017, from http://www.worldbank.org/

Government of India, Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation., 2017, from
http://mospi.nic.in/data

62
Hackett, S., Krachey, M., Brown, S., and Hankin, D. (2005). Derby Fisheries,
Individual Quotas, and Transition in the Fish Processing Industry. Marine
Resource Economics, 20, 47-60.

Hardin, G. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. Science, 162, 2017.

Haward, M., and Wilson, M. Co-management and Rights-Based Fisheries., 2017,
from http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/X8985E/x8985e06.htm

Herrmann, M. (2005). Individual Vessel Quota Price-Induced Effects for Canadian
Pacific Halibut: Before and After Alaska IFQs. Canadian Journal of
Agricultural Economics, 48, 195-210.

Hersoug, B. (2011). Fishing Rights to the Right People? Management Options in
Crowded Small-Scale Fisheries. Mast, 10, 15-39.

Higashida, K., and Managi, S. (2010). Efficiency of Individual Transferable Quotas
(ITQs) when Fishers are able to Choose Vessel Sizes: An Experimental
Approach. Unpublished manuscript.

Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (2016). Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations.

Isaacs, M. (2011). Individual Transferable Quotas, Poverty Alleviation and
Challenges for Small-Country Fisheries Policy in South Africa. Mast, 10, 6384.

Knowler, D., Philcox, N., Nathan, S., Delamare, W., Haider, W., and Gupta, K.
(2009). Assessing Prospects for Shrimp Culture in the Indian Sundarbans: A

63
Combined Simulation Modelling and Choice Experiment Approach. Marine
Policy, 33, 613-623.

Kroetz, K., Sanchirico, J., Pena-Torres, J., and Novoa, D. (2016). Evaluation of the
Chilean Jack Mackerel ITQ System. Unpublished manuscript.

Mandal, M., Dandapath, P., and Bhushan, S. (2013). Digha Sankarpur Littoral Tract
A Geographical Case Study. International Journal of Humanities and Social
Science Invention, 2(4), 46-54.

Marine Small-Scale Fisheries of West Bengal: An Introduction (1990). India: Bay of
Bengal Programme for Fisheries Development.

Matulich, C., Mittelhammer, R., and Greenberg, J. (1995). Ex-vessel Price
Determination in the Alaska King Crab Fishery: A Formula Price Contract
Under Uncertainty? Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
28, 374-387.

Matulich, C., and Sever, M. (1999). Reconsidering the Initial Allocation of ITQs: The
Search for a Pareto-Safe Allocation between Fishing and Processing Sectors.
Land Economics, 75, 203-219.

Mukherjee, Z. (2015). Unilateral Conservation Policies and the Magnitude of Trade
Induced Transfer of Bycatch. Unpublished manuscript.

Munro, G. (1982). Fisheries, Extended Jurisdiction and the Economics of Common
Property Resources. The Canadian Journal of Economics, 15, 405-425.

64
The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture(2016). Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations.

TACs and Quotas: Managing Fisheries., 2017, from https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/
fishing_rules/tacs_en

Taylor, M. (1982). Community, Anarchy and Liberty. Cambridge.: Cambridge
University Press.

Thapliyal, S. (2013)., 2017, from http://fishlaw.org/fisheries-law-in-india-a-briefoverview/

Thomson, K., and Gray, T. (2009). From Community-based to Co-management:
Improvement or Deterioration in Fisheries Governance in the Cherai Poyil
Fishery in the Cochin Estuary, Kerala, India? Marine Policy, 33, 537-543.

Titenberg, T., and Lewis, L. (2009). Common-pool Resources: Fisheries and Other
Commercially Valuable Species. Environmental and natural resource
economics

65
APPENDIX A

Fish species and total catch by trawlers (GN), motor boat (OM)
and row boat (NM) fishers
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APPENDIX B
Questionnaire
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